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Abstract 
In the past fifteen years central banks have been taking steps towards greater 
monetary policy transparency. This paper uses a vector error correction 
model (VECM) to investigate the role transparency has had on changing the 
dynamics of the credit channel of the Australian monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) lifted all 
interest rate restrictions in 1986, and then started to announce changes in the 
cash rate in January 1990 giving the financial system a clearly defined 
indication of its monetary policy stance. Furthermore, the RBA formalised 
its inflation targeting operating objective in 1996. This paper gives a clear 
indication of how a more transparent framework has affected the setting of 
bank lending rates over three distinct periods. Our results show that 
responsiveness of bank lending rates to monetary policy changes improved 
in each period corresponding to an innovation in monetary policy 
transparency. Moreover, Anticipation effects in banking lending rates are 
evident only in the period after the RBA formalised its inflation targeting 
operating objective in 1996. This suggests that Banks only changed lending 
rates once they had learnt that the RBA was communicating a credible 
commitment to change the path of future short-term interest rates. However, 
other results show that price discrimination has been evident between the 
business and household sectors. To our knowledge, this analysis is the first 
study that looks at the issue of central bank transparency on bank lending 
rates. 
JEL classification:  C32, E43, E52, E58 
Key words:  Interest rates; monetary policy; central bank transparency; vector error 
correction model; variance decomposition 
 




The deregulation of the Australian financial system has caused changes in both the 
nature of the Australian money market and the manner in which the effects of monetary 
policy are transmitted through to the economy by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). Since 
the failure of monetary targets in the early 1980s, the RBA moved from a checklist approach 
in the mid to late 1980s, to announcing monetary policy changes in 1990, and to the 
formalisation of inflation targeting through the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
in 1996. As Coppel and Connolly (2003), Lowe (1995), MacFarlane (1999) and Milbourne 
(1992) note the RBA has only one instrument to implement monetary policy, the cash rate. 
Through changes in the cash rate the RBA is able to prompt changes in market interest rates, 
which in turn influences bank lending rate setting. Hence, there are three distinct periods to 
examine effects of transparency and the dynamic linkages between the cash rate and bank 
lending rates.  
A change in monetary policy stance by the RBA will affect the shortest maturity market 
interest rates. However, if market participants are forward looking, then their expectations of 
future policy actions, and hence future short-term interest rates, will affect longer maturity 
rates (Sack, 1998a). This expectation of future movements is an important facet of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. If monetary policy is stable and well understood, or 
transparent, then market participants might well be able to anticipate future RBA policy 
decisions. Consequently, one would expect market interest rates to contain information about 
future RBA changes to the overnight cash rate. Hence, if financial institutions believe the 
RBA monetary policy stance is credible then bank lending rates should also show anticipation 
effects.  
By examining the dynamic linkages between market and overnight cash rate changes, 
the degree to which market rates anticipate future policy changes can be tested. Fama (1984), 
Hardouvelis (1988), Longstaff (2000) and Mishkin (1988) provide evidence of predictability 
at short end of the term structure, although they also show that this predictability holds over 
very short horizons. However, recent work by Lange, Sack, and Windsell (2003) show that 
this predictability has changed over time as a result of policy measures introduced by the 
Federal Reserve (Fed). Specifically, they show that market interest rates are better predictor   2 
  
of monetary policy changes from the mid to late 1990s, and that the prediction horizon of Fed 
policy changes has lengthened to several months in advance. They further show that the 
contemporaneous response to policy moves has shortened. Coppel and Connolly (2003) found 
similar results using Australian data in relation to market rates being better predictors of 
monetary policy movements, but do not examine prediction horizons beyond two weeks. 
Gasbarro and Monroe (2004) also examined Australian data but only focus on the reaction in 
market rates to policy changes and did not examine anticipation effects.  
With the limited extent of Australian research on this area, it seems prudent to extend 
the literature by posing the following interrelated research questions:  
(1)  The RBA has implemented a policy of greater transparency of the monetary policy 
framework; what effects has this had on the dynamics of the credit channel of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism?  
(2)  Greater transparency of the monetary policy framework should mean that market 
participants are better able to anticipate monetary policy changes in the cash rate. If so, 
there should be greater anticipation of changes apparent in market rates since the 
Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy was signed in 1996. If there is greater 
anticipation in market rates, then anticipation effects should be evident in bank lending 
rates as financial institutions cost of funds is directly linked to market rates?  
 
To explore these research questions, vector error correction model (VECM) 
methodology is employed to explore the various dynamics of bank lending rate adjustment in 
response to changes in the RBA cash target rate. This approach will look at how lending rates 
are set in relation to the RBA cash target rate. Moreover, by exploring the dynamics, it will be 
possible to comment on some of the macroeconomic implications of the transmission 
mechanism between changes in the cash rate and lending rates. Of particular interest, is how 
the importance of the cash rate in driving lending rates has changed over the period studied? 
As stated earlier, the RBA started to announce changes in the cash rate in January 1990, 
giving the financial system a clearly defined indication of its monetary policy stance. 
Furthermore, the RBA formalised its inflation targeting operating objective in 1996. This 
study will be able to give a clear indication of how successful moving to a more transparent 
framework has affected the setting of lending rates over three distinct periods.     3 
  
Secondly, the VEC modelling of the bank lending rate markets will add to existing 
literature. Most of the literature is focused on the extent of the pass-through of monetary 
policy changes to retail interest rates as a result of deregulation of financial systems. 
However, the focus is changed herein to see if transparency of monetary policy objectives has 
had any beneficial effects on the pass through of policy rate changes: if market interest rates 
anticipate policy changes, then financial intermediaries should be able to incorporate any 
change in the cost of funds into retail interest rates quicker. To our knowledge, this analysis is 
the first study that looks at the issue of central bank transparency on bank lending rates.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses monetary policy transparency 
and the Australian experience; Section 3 outlines the vector error correction model; Section 4 
describes the data; Sections 5 and 6 reports on unit root and co-integration tests, as well as the 
results of econometric investigations; and Section 7 concludes.  
2.1  Monetary Policy Transparency and Predictability 
 
In the majority of developed nations, central banks conduct their monetary policy by 
either targeting a short-term market interest rate or by setting an official interest rate for their 
open market operations. These policy rates or targets anchor the entire term structure of 
interest rates (Piazzesi, 2005). At very short maturities, monetary policy directly affects 
market interest rates via normal arbitrage mechanisms. However, monetary policy effects on 
longer maturity market interest rates are more indirect as market participants’ expectations of 
future policy rate changes are incorporated into market rates (Rudebusch, 1995). Hence one 
can study market interest rates and their ability to predict future monetary policy changes. 
One can also assess whether this predictability changes over time, when either the monetary 
policy framework or markets have undergone significant change.  
According to Woodford (1999), one view of monetary policy is that if shocks arrive in a 
random fashion, the optimal policy response is equally unanticipated, and the central bank’s 
policy rate will then also follow a random walk. However, observed monetary policy changes 
are generally not a random walk; central banks often choose to implement monetary policy 
via gradualism, a series of small rate changes in the same direction. The RBA’s recent round 
of cash rate increases is a typical example of this observation. Some attribute the policy of    4 
  
gradualism to a preference of central banks to minimise interest rate variability.
1 
Alternatively, it reflects monetary policy inertia, in that central banks are too slow to respond 
to new information.  
Alternatively, Sack (1998a, 1998b) demonstrates that gradualism may constitute an 
optimal response to random economic shocks if economic agents are forward looking. As 
Goodfriend (1991) argues, output and prices do not respond to daily fluctuations in shorter 
market rates, but only to longer-term interest rates. Thus the central bank can achieve its 
stabilisation goals only if its actions affect those longer-term rates. However, long-term rates 
are determined by market expectations of future short rates. Hence, Woodford (1999) 
suggests an effective response by the central bank to inflationary pressures would be for the 
central bank to communicate a credible commitment to change the path of future short rates. 
This can be achieved by either keeping rates at the same level for an extended period of time 
once rates have been raised, or by implementing successive small changes in the target rate 
after an initial move in the same direction. Market participants will then incorporate these 
beliefs into their expectations of future short rates, and longer term interest rates will reflect 
the central bank’s expected future target rate changes. Thus Woodford (1999) asserts that it is 
indeed optimal for a central bank to commit to inertia. This has two important implications. 
First, the central bank will be able to achieve its long-term objective of price stability without 
excessive short-term interest rate volatility, and second, market interest rates will contain 
information about future policy changes in the relevant target rate. Also, Goodfriend (1998) 
further argues that if the market correctly anticipates future policy decisions, then future 
policy changes will be reflected in market interest rates before being implemented by the 
central bank, as the market participants do not anticipate not only the first policy change, but 
also the sequence of future changes in the same direction.  
In the past fifteen years central banks have been taking steps towards greater 
transparency.
2,3  These initiatives have included the public communication of both policy 
goals, the central bank’s view on the economic outlook, and the communication of voting 
procedures, including individual votes. Winkler (2000) argues, however, that openness or the 
amount of information published, does not necessarily equate to transparency. A transparent 
policy ought to be clear, honest and use a language that is easily understood. Geraats (2002) 
provides a definition of transparency used in most of the literature, as the absence of 
asymmetric information between monetary policy makers and other economic agents. This   5 
  
means that it reduces uncertainty and this is often believed to be beneficial. Moreover, 
transparency may affect the incentives that policy makers face to manipulate private sector 
beliefs through signalling and reputation building. According to Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, 
Roger, and Sterne (1998), transparency is now a key component of central bank’s monetary 
policy framework, only surpassed by central bank independence and the maintenance of low 
inflation expectations.  
Greater transparency should then allow market participants to anticipate future policy 
decisions with a greater degree of accuracy: transparency leads to predictability. Furthermore, 
transparency can also enhance the central bank’s credibility. As Haldane (1997) noted, clear 
communication of policy objectives and its decision-making processes are likely to strengthen 
public confidence in the central bank’s ability to deliver its objective of a stable inflation 
environment. Since market participants form views of future interest rate changes that reflect 
future expected policy changes required to achieve this price stability, stable inflation 
expectations are likely to also contribute to policy rate predictability. If market interest rates 
do anticipate monetary policy changes to some extent then banks cost of funds should also 
reflect this anticipation. Hence, central bank transparency market interest rate predictability 
effects should also be seen in the dynamics of bank lending rates.  
2.2  Transparency and Monetary Policy in Australia 
 
The Australian monetary policy framework has undergone important changes since the 
financial system was deregulated. These changes are likely to have contributed to changes in 
the RBA’s credibility and perceived commitment to its policy targets. This in turn may have 
affected the market’s understanding of the future course of monetary policy, and with it, the 
predictive ability of market interest rates.  
Prior to 1985 Australia followed the convention of monetary targeting based around an 
annual target for M3. As MacFarlane (1999) explained, monetary targeting presupposes a 
stable statistical relationship for the demand of money, implying that inflation is linked to the 
growth rate of the money supply. However, as a result of financial deregulation, especially the 
floating of the dollar, this long run relationship became unstable. As a result the RBA 
discontinued monetary targeting in January 1985.     6 
  
The RBA then followed, albeit briefly, a ‘checklist’ approach. The checklist contained a 
number of economic variables that were to be taken into account in setting monetary policy. 
However, MacFarlane (1999) explains that this approach failed in that it did not have a 
sufficiently ‘well thought out’ economic rationale or any criteria for determining which 
indicators were important. MacFarlane (1999) particularly emphasises that this approach 
failed to distinguish between the instrument of monetary policy, intermediate targets, and 
ultimate targets. This approach was abandoned by the end of 1987, effectively leaving the 
RBA with no articulated framework for monetary policy until inflation targeting was 
introduced in 1993. MacFarlane (1999) noted that this lack of a monetary policy framework 
resulted in the RBA having a lack of credibility during this period. However, this did not 
prevent the bank from introducing important transparency reforms at the time.  
Before January 1990 the monetary policy stance of the RBA was not announced when 
policy rate changes were implemented. Battellino, Broadbent and Lowe (1997) explain that 
market participants determined the RBA’s policy stance from any changes in the cash rate and 
in the bank’s involvement in the money market. The advantage of this arrangement was that it 
provided a degree of flexibility in policy implementation, allowing for reversals in policy 
stance without the Bank losing credibility. Battellino, et al (1997), further argue that such an 
arrangement reinforced public perception that markets set financial prices.  
From January 1990 however, the RBA made public announcements explaining the 
change in stance of monetary policy.
4  This arrangement delivered significant benefits to the 
Australian financial system (Battellino, et al, 1997). These include greater central bank 
discipline with a clearer focus on the objective of policy changes; increased credibility and 
independence of the RBA; and improvements in the transmission mechanism. The pass-
through of changes in the cash rate, especially to retail rates, became noticeably faster, due to 
the elimination of the recognition lag and a greater pressure on financial institutions from 
customers and the media to change their retail rates than was previously the case.  
The inflation targeting framework was formalised with the release of the Statement on 
the Conduct of Monetary Policy in August 1996, which explicitly set out the RBA’s 
framework of instruments and objectives for monetary policy. Coppel and Connolly (2003) 
explain that subsequent measures to improve transparency of the monetary policy framework 
have included the quarterly Statement on Monetary Policy (introduced in 1997), various    7 
  
public addresses and reporting of the Governor to the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration.  
Thus, three distinct time periods with various degrees of transparency can be studied. 
The first period is from 1986 to 1989, which corresponds to the period after the abolition of 
money targets and interest rate controls, to the introduction of announcements of the cash 
target rate. The second period is from 1990 to July 1996 which can be thought of as a 
transitional period during which a number of initiatives were introduced, including inflation 
targeting. The third period runs form August 1996 to the present, corresponding to the time 
from when inflation targeting was formalised.  
Currently, monetary policy is transmitted through to the economy via the following 
process. A change in the target cash rate affects the overnight interest rate on money market 
funds, otherwise known as the cash rate. This change in the cash rate then feeds through to 
short-term interest rates. However, the length of the lag is dependent on whether the change in 
RBA policy that produced the rate change is believed to be permanent. The credit channel of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism is particularly important given the current high 
level of Australian private debt, especially the high level of housing debt.  
2.3   Australian Empirical Research  
 
Elliott and Bewley (1994) stated that in order for monetary policy to have any effect on 
real variables, such as output, changes in the RBA official market interest rate must induce a 
permanent change in the unofficial cash rate.
5  If a long run relationship exists between the 
two rates, then this will be the case. Similarly, a long run relationship must exist between the 
cash rate and all other market rates for RBA policy initiatives to be effective. Further, changes 
in the RBA cash rate must be reflected in market interest rates in a timely manner. A 
significant time lag in the adjustment of market interest rates, and in particular bank lending 
rates, will diminish the intended effect of monetary policy.  
Elliott and Bewley (1994) find a stable relationship between the official cash rate and 
the unofficial rate, concluding that the RBA fully controls the official rate. Hence, due to the 
long run relationship between the official and unofficial rates the RBA can effectively target 
unofficial rates.     8 
  
Lim and Martin (1994) found that the lag between a change in the cash rate and bank-
bill rates was three to four days; this finding most likely results from the pre-announcement 
period. They also found the market responded more quickly to a change in the cash rate since 
the introduction of announcements, concluding that the announcement affect was an 
important factor resulting in a more stable environment. However, Campbell and Lewis 
(1998) found that announcement of changes in the cash target rate was incorporated into 
market rates virtually instantaneously, in the post-announcement environment.  
While Kim and Sheen (2000) mainly examined international linkages between daily 
time series of U.S. and Australian 3-month Treasury Bills and 10-year Government Bonds 
from 1987-95 within a GARCH framework, their results suggest that market participants 
believed the RBA targeted the CPI, prior to formalisation of the Statement on the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy. They also found that monetary policy announcements had significant effects 
on interest rates; particularly their volatility in the short-term.  
In relation to Australian studies on transparency, Coppel and Connolly (2003) attempted 
to discern the impact of greater monetary policy transparency over the period since the late 
1980s. They examine whether interest rate variability has changed, the degree to which 
financial markets anticipate policy moves and movements in the yield curve at the time of 
changes in monetary policy. They find that interest rate volatility at the short end has fallen 
dramatically since the late 1980s and the extent to which market participants anticipate 
changes in the policy rate has gradually risen, as has the speed of reaction to interest rate 
announcements. These results are consistent with Karfakis and Phipps (1996) who found that 
the mean and variance in the risk premium of bank bill rates has reduced post January 1990, 
which points to a more stable monetary policy environment.  
Gasbarro and Munroe (2004), using data from January 1986 to September 2001, 
examined the reaction of Australian financial markets to RBA target rate changes within 
covert and open disclosure regimes. They found significantly different announcement day 
responses between the two disclosure regimes for both short-term and long-term treasury 
securities. Overall, their results indicate that when monetary policy is more transparent the 
market reaction is less pronounced, consistent with the findings above.      9 
  
2.4  Transparency effects on bank Lending Rates 
The effects of greater transparency and anticipation on bank lending rates are also 
considered. As financial intermediaries’ cost of funds are linked to market interest rates, any 
anticipation of RBA monetary policy changes in market interest rates, should allow 
intermediaries to adjust lending rates quicker.  
Battellino, et al (1997), show that the average time for banks to change their mortgage 
and business indicator rates has reduced in the post-announcement period. In the pre-
announcement period lending rates took up to twenty weeks to respond to changes in the RBA 
cash rate, whereas in the post-announcement period changes are passed on to lending rates 
within one to four weeks. Lowe (1995) looked at the extent of the cash rate pass-through to 
retail rates over the period 1986 to 1994. He estimated that the degree of long run pass-
through for mortgage rates and business indicator rates were  
0.65 and 0.89 respectively. However, he also found that the margin between the RBA target 
cash rate and lending interest rates, especially for mortgage rates, increased in the post-
announcement period, only starting to narrow in late 1994. This was indicative of imperfect 
competition, as well as price discrimination, in the retail market.  
However, as bank lending rates are not totally market derived there exist a number of 
reasons that explain slow or lagged changes in response to changes in the monetary policy 
rate. Firstly, Heffernan (1997) suggests a possible justification for error correction behaviour 
is the presence of convex adjustment costs. These produce a staggered response to a change in 
the cash rate. Even if this is not the case, other factors such as collusive behaviour might 
produce delays in adjustment. Cotterelli and Kourelis (1994) also believe that there may be 
tacit collusion among banks when faced with disruption caused by a change in the cash rate. 
A feature of oligopolistic markets is the unpredictable response of market participants to price 
changes, as each bank must outguess the others in the setting of rates. This makes the process 
of reaching a new equilibrium hazardous and slow.  
Secondly, Heffernan (1997) argues that price discrimination is likely to be present, 
which suggests that banks exploit consumer inertia: bank customers tend to be in possession    10 
  
of old information and are reluctant to change banks because of either real or perceived 
switching costs. Only a small percentage of well-informed customers are prepared to switch 
banks rapidly, as suggested by Martin and Hawkins (1992). A bank will price discriminate to 
capture both the well-informed and inert groups. Lowe (1995) noted that price discrimination 
is evident in the Australian market, in particular the housing market. Mainly a legacy of credit 
rationing in previous decades, Lowe argues that the banks exploited customer loyalty by 
discriminating between existing and potential customers by introducing ‘honeymoon’ rates 
for new customers. This type of price discrimination is sustainable only if existing customers 
did not switch to other institutions. While switching costs discouraged some customers from 
taking advantage of discounted rates, Lowe (1995) believes that the willingness of customers 
to switch to a new bank played a role in the narrowing of the margin between the cash rate 
and housing loans rates from late 1994, as can be seen below in Figure 1.  
Thirdly, the banking sector could incur sunk or menu costs when the cash rate changes. 
Martin and Hawkins (1992) note that market rates represent a banks’ marginal cost of funds, 
but their average cost of funds will move more slowly as banks raise substantial amounts of 
funds at fixed rates and it takes time to roll these over. Lowe (1995) also noted that the 
average cost of bank deposits is an important factor in the pricing of lending margins. Thus, a 
change in the deposit structure will affect lending spreads. Lowe (1995) also noted that the 
proportion of low interest deposits to total deposits fell from approximately forty percent in 
1986 to sixteen percent in 1994, bringing pressure to lag the adjustment of retail lending rates 
to changes in the cash rate. Strong demand for housing loans in particular, also meant that 
financial institutions could maintain the resulting increase in the margin between the average 
housing loan rate and the cash rate (Lowe, 1995). Furthermore, many advertisements will be 
useless if repricing is necessary following a change in the cash rate. This would encourage 
banks to stick with the set rate, especially if the change in the cash rate is expected only to be 
temporary.  
Fourthly, Cotterelli and Kourelis (1994) believe that lending rate stickiness may result 
from banks following non-profit maximising behaviour. This maybe the case in financial 
systems dominated by state owned banks, as such was the case until the early 1990s in 
Australia. In such an instance lending rate adjustment may be delayed due to political 
pressures or simple inefficiency. In general, banks will react more promptly to changes in the    11 
  
cash rate if non-profit maximising behaviour is penalised by market forces. If market forces 
are weak because of barriers to entry, or absence of competition from non-bank 
intermediaries, inefficiency will not be penalised, which may result in lending rate stickiness. 
Under conditions of perfect competition, short run economic profit is quickly diminished by 
the entrance of new firms, and/or, by existing firms lowering their prices (Lowe, 1995). New 
providers of finance entered the Australian market in the early 1990s, particularly in the 
housing loan market. With lower operating costs than existing institutions, mortgage 
originators and lenders could offer profitable lower prices. However, due to the conservative 
nature of customers and high start up costs, new institutions only entered the market slowly 
and took a considerable time before they established a sizeable market share (Lowe 1995).  
Figure 1:  Large and Small Business and Standard Variable Mortgage Rate 
versus RBA Cash Target Rate, 1986:01 –2004:10 
 
 
Finally, Martin and Hawkins (1992) suggest that banks wanting to recover from bad and 
doubtful debts will lag adjustments in retail rates downwards. Australian banks wrote off 
some $28 billion in bad debts in the early 1990s. Lowe (1995, p24) makes the pertinent point: 
“… it was only after the recession hit, and the banks experienced record bad debts, that 
spreads widened. Similarly, margins have only narrowed after bad debts expenses have 
declined.” This point is highlighted in figure 1 above; and it is only after the introduction of    12 
  
the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy in 1996 that retail interest rates have settled 
into a stable pattern which can be interpreted that the bank are confident in the RBA’s 
credibility on monetary policy.  
3.  The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
As the RBA is known to respond to changes in market conditions; the cash rate may be 
endogenous. By applying a VECM methodology, the cash rate can be endogenised and, the 
dynamics and causal structure of bank lending rate adjustment in both the short-term and 
long-term are easier to analyse, as VECMs allow the simultaneous estimation of short-term 
and long-term inter-market adjustments. Estimation of these models is through the Johansen 
(1991) full information maximum likelihood technique, which tests cointegration in a system 
of equations while estimating the parameters of the VECM. Two steps are used to test for 
cointegration, firstly using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1979) test to determine the 
order of integration. Then if the series are of the same order we use the Johansen (1991) 
maximum likelihood method to test whether a single cointegrating vector exists. If the series 





















































































































, 4 4  (1d) 
where  = the large business lending rate at time t;  t B
  = the small business lending rate at time t;  t LB
t H = the housing mortgage lending rate at time t; 
t ect = the error correction term, determined from the residuals of the cointegrating 
equation 
 
When variables are cointegrated, deviations from this long-term equilibrium will, in the 
short-term, feedback on the changes in the dependent variable in order to force the movement 
towards the long-run equilibrium. If the dependent variable is driven by the long-term    13 
  
equilibrium error, then it is responding to this feedback. Thus, inferences of long-term causal 
effects are determined by the significance of the t-test on the lagged error correction term. If 
not, it is responding only to short-term shocks. The t-tests of the differenced explanatory 
variables will give an indication of short-term causal effects. However, it is the coefficient of 
the lagged error-correction term that reflects the proportion by which the long-run 
disequilibrium in the dependent variable is error-corrected in the short-run.  
As a supplement to this VECM analysis, impulse response functions are estimated and 
graphed, followed by calculating forecast variance decompositions. An impulse response 
function describes the response of an endogenous variable to a change in one of the 
innovations or error term, it ε . Hence, impulse response functions involve assuming that the 
system is at a steady state, and then perturbing it by introducing a shock or innovation into the 
error term of one of the VECM equations. The shock filters back through the lag structure of 
all VECM equations simultaneously, and the value of the dependent variable at each period 
that follows can be calculated and plotted.  
Variance decomposition partitions the variance of the forecast error of an endogenous 
variable into proportions attributable to shocks in each other variable in the system including 
its own (Masih and Masih, 2001). Variance decompositions literally provide a breakdown of 
the change in value of a variable in a given period arising from changes in the same variable 
in addition to other variables in previous periods. Hence, the variance decomposition of a 
VEC model gives information about the relative importance of the random innovations. A 
variable that is optimally forecast from its own lagged values will have all its forecast errors 
accounted for by its own disturbances (Sims, 1982). However, if other variables are 
significant in deriving forecast errors for a particular variable, then variance decomposition 
will account for the influence of those other innovations.  
However, it must be noted that the interpretation of impulse response functions and 
variance decompositions can be ambiguous. The ambiguity in interpretation arises from the 
fact that the innovations are usually correlated with each other to some degree. When the 
errors are correlated, they have a common component that cannot be identified with any 
specific variable. This study uses a standard application of impulse response functions and    14 
  
variance decomposition, where errors are orthogonalised through Choleski decomposition so 
that the covariance matrix of the resulting innovations is diagonal. Results from this method 
are usually sensitive to the lag length used and the ordering of the variables (Masih & Masih, 
2001). Thus, as Hamilton (1994) suggests, the ordering of the variables should represent our 
understanding of the economic relationship involved as far as possible; that is, ordering of the 
variables: RBA cash target rate, large business lending rate, small business lending rate, and 




All data is sourced from statistics published in the Bulletin of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia. Four series of monthly data are used covering the total sample period 1986:01 to 
2004:10:  
i)   Following Lim and Martin (1994), the RBA discount rate is used as a proxy for the 
target cash rate for 1989:01 to 1989:12. Following Lim and Martin (1994), this is used 
so that explicit changes in the cash rate before the commencement of announced 
changes in the target cash rate in 1990 can be accounted for; The RBA target cash rate 
is used for 1990:01 to 2004:10;  
ii)   The bank-housing loan interest rate for owner occupation is an average of the prevailing 
end of month standard variable rate of large bank housing lenders;  
iii)   Large and small business indicator rates are an average of end of month indicator rates 
on variable business loans. In most cases, a margin is added when setting rates on 
individual loans. Large business rates generally relate to loans of greater than $100,000, 
and following Lowe (1995) are considered a proxy for banks cost of funds.  
5.  Unit Root and Co-integration Tests 
Prior to the estimation of an error correction model, it is necessary to conduct unit-root 
and cointegration tests for each series of observations. An ADF unit root test was conducted 
for each interest rate series, over each of the three periods. Results are displayed in appendix 
tables 1 and 2. In all cases, the absence of a unit root could not be established, as we were able 
to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. As there was no evidence of a    15 
  
second unit root being present, it was concluded that all four series are integrated to order one, 
I(1).  
Given that that the base rate and other interest rates have been found to be I(1), the 
existence of a linear combination between the cash rate and all four interest rates would imply 
that they are co-integrated. In such a case, an error correction model then can represent the 
bivariate and multivariate process (Engle and Granger, 1987). Thus the presence of a co-
integrating vector between all retail interest rates and the cash rate must be established to 
confirm the validity of estimating the VECM equations (1a-d).  
In order to test for a cointegrating vector the Johansen (1991) maximum likelihood 
procedure is used. The existence of a single cointegrating vector was confirmed in every case 
at the 95% level of confidence. Refer to Table 1 for detailed results.  
Table 1: Johanson Cointegration Test (1991)
 
 
6. Estimation  Results 
 
Tables 2-4 report the results of the VECM estimations for the interest rate series for 
each period. The RBA cash target rate variable (ΔB) has a significant lagged error correction    16 
  
term ( ) for the periods 1986–1989 and 1996–1999 indicating that this variable is 
endogenous in these periods. However, for the period 1990–1996 results indicate that RBA 
cash target rate is exogenous and only reacting to its own lagged difference in the short term 
(ΔB(-1)), albeit at the 10 percent significance level. This result can be directly attributed to the 
introduction of monetary policy announcements in January 1990. This period was 
characterised by high inflationary expectations and each announced change in the RBA cash 
target rate was aimed at reducing those expectations, particularly in the early 1990’s. The 
results indicate that the RBA had a high degree of control over retail rates for this period. This 
is highlighted in the plot of the impulse response functions for the system in Figure 3.  
1 − t ect
For the period 1986–1989 the RBA cash target rate reacts in the short term to ΔB(-1), 
ΔSB(-1), and ΔH(-2). This suggests that although the RBA cash rate had some control over 
the system, other factors feedback into the system. This is understandable in the fact that the 
RBA had no clear policy target during this period and the market having to discern the RBA’s 
monetary policy stance from its action in the money market. For the most recent period 1996–
2004, the RBA cash target rate does not react in the short term to any variable. This suggests 
that while the RBA cash target rate was endogenous to the system, it was independent of any 
short term influence from bank lending rates. Hence central bank transparency has enabled 
the RBA to have clear control over the short term.  
Large business lending rates appear to be endogenous for all periods. Large business 
rates react in the short term to ΔB(-1), ΔSB(-1) and ΔH(-2) for 1986-1989; reacts to no 
variable for 1990-1995; and only ΔB(-1) for 1996-2004. This is similar to the structure for the 
RBA cash rate over the same period indicating that in the short-run the RBA cash rate and 
large business rate react to the same variables, with a similar speed.  
Small business lending rates are exogenous for 1986-1989 and endogenous for the other 
two periods. In the short term they react only to ΔB(-1) for 1986-1989; no variable for 1990-
1995; and ΔLB(-1) and ΔSB(-1) for 1996-2004. This would indicate that changes in small 
business interest rates would be determined in the short term from changes in the large 
business rate and the RBA cash rate, especially for the latter two periods. The results indicate 
some degree of stickiness in small business rates, with rates reacting only to changes in the 
bank cost of funds.     17 
  
Housing loan rates, however, appear to be exogenous to the system for 1986-1989, 
reacting in the short term to ΔSB(-1), and ΔSB(-2). This suggests that for this period changes 
in housing loans were sticky. This result is highlighted in the plot of the impulse response 
functions in figure 2. For the period 1990-1995 housing loan interest rates are endogenous and 
react in the short term to ΔLB(-1), the proxy for the banks cost of funds. However, for 1996-
2004 housing loan interest rates are endogenous and react in the short term to ΔLB(-1) and 
ΔH(-1) indicating that changes in housing rates are reacting to the cost of funds and 
competition in the housing sector. The results also suggest that financial institutions have 
discriminated against the housing and small business sectors in favour of the large business 
sector from the mid 1980’s to the mid 1990’s.  
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Table 3: VECM Results: Period 1990:02 – 1996:07
 
Table 4: VECM Results: Period 1996:11 – 2000:10
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Impulse response functions have been calculated and plotted for responses by the 
various interest rates to a one standard deviation shock to the system for all periods estimated. 
Refer to Figures 2-4.  
 




Figure 2 plots the responses over the period 1986-1989. In response to a shock from the 
RBA cash rate (BASE), all bank lending rates move to a new permanent level, that is 
monetary policy induced permanent changes in retail rates. For all lending rates it takes about 
20 months for the system to stabilise. The small business interest rates react less quickly to the 
shock than other lending rates. Shocks from large business and housing interest rates also 
cause permanent changes in other rates. This is expected given that monetary policy was not 
announced in this period. Housing loan interest rates appear to lag changes in the business 
rates. The most striking feature of these graphs is that a shock to the system by housing loan 
rates produces a negligible effect on the other rates, confirming the exogenity of housing loan 
interest rates and their sticky pricing nature.     20 
  
Figure 3: Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovation,1990:03 – 1996:07 
 
 
Figure 3 plots the responses for the period 1990-1995. It is very evident that the RBA 
had a very good control over the system with the introduction of announced changes in 
monetary policy. A shock to the system from the RBA cash rate induces all retail rates to 
move to a new permanent level at approximately 25 basis points higher, with about 10 months 
for the system to stabilise, quicker than the previous period. Unlike the last period, a shock to 
the system from any of the lending rates produces little or no response in the other rates. This 
again is indicative of the market being surprised by changes in the RBA’s monetary policy 
stance, and having to learn the how the many transparency measures effect the financial 
system. The responses of the lending rates to shocks in their own rates, however, still indicate 
some price stickiness with housing rates relatively more sticky than the business rates. This is 
consistent with price discrimination between the housing and business sectors.     21 
  
Figure 4: Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovation,1996:11 – 2004:10 
 
 
Figure 4 plots the responses for the period 1996-2004. There are clear signs of 
anticipation effects in this period, particularly in the negative long run responses of housing 
loan rates to a shock from large business rates, the proxy for the banks cost of funds, and to 
shocks from itself. These effects would derive from increased transparency, as well as 
competition effects. The RBA target cash rate still has the most influence on the system, but 
its effect is diminishes in the longer run due to anticipation effects. Moreover, the size of a 
shock by the RBA cash target rate to shift the system has reduced. The standard deviation of 
the RBA cash target rate residuals are approximately half of the previous period, however, 
they produce responses in the lending rates of equivalent size to the previous period. This 
implies that the market believes that the RBA is sending credible signals to the market and 
that the RBA does not have to change its monetary policy stance as often as has in the past to 
produce the same level of lasting effects in the financial system.                                                                         22 
  
Finally, variance decomposition analysis was conducted to gauge to what extent shocks to 
certain lending rates are explained by other interest rates. Further evidence on the linkages 
amongst interest rates can be gained from this approach. Noting that the Choleski 
decomposition is sensitive to the lag length used and to the ordering of the variables, we adopt 
the same lag lengths as used in estimating the VECM and use the ordering: RBA cash target; 
large business; small business: housing loans. This ordering is adopted, as from the evidence 
in the above analysis; changes in the RBA cash rate appear to feed through to large business 
loans, the cost of funds proxy, then to small business and housing loans. Results of a one 
standard deviation shock were estimated over 40 periods. The relevant variance 
decompositions are presented in Figures 5 -7.                  
                
   Figure 5:  Variance Decomposition, 1986:01 – 1989:12 
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Figure 5 presents the results for the period 1986-1989. Forecast variance for the RBA 
cash target rate appears in the short-run to be explained by its own variance in the previous 
period, with 90% of the variance explained by the cash target rate. In the longer-run, variance 
in the RBA cash target rate is explained by 80% cash target rate and 10% small business rates. 
This result shows that although the RBA did not announce changes in monetary policy stance 
and no discernable monetary policy targets, the RBA still had control over the cash rate.  
For large business loans short-run variance is caused by 20-70% of the cash target rate, 
with the remainder by its own rate. In the longer term, the cash target rate explains 50% of 
forecast variance. Small business loans appear to gain most of its short term direction from 
the large business rates and the cash rate, while in the longer term the RBA cash rate is the 
more dominant factor. Housing loans over this period, however, appear to take little direction 
from the base rate except marginally in the long run. Most of the short term is dominated by 
previous housing loan rates, while in the longer-term business rates becomes important 
explaining variance. This is indicative of sticky pricing in the short term, with the long term 
pricing influenced by banks cost of funds.  
Thus, for this period changes in the RBA cash rate would seem to be the major 
contributor to long term variance in business rates, while large business rates drive the 
variance in the short term. If we take the view that large business rates are a proxy for the cost 
of funds or market rates, then we can imply that general market forces explain short-run 
variance. However, housing loans appear to be independent of the other interest rates, at least 
in the shorter term. It also implies housing loan rates are less competitive or less responsive to 
changes in the RBA cash rate than business rates in this period.  
Figure 6 presents the results for the period 1990-1996. There is a marked change in the 
proportions of the relevant rates in explaining the forecast variance in this period. The base 
rate is the dominant driver of variance in both the short and long term for its own and business 
rates. The base rate also has a larger influence on housing loan rates in this period, especially 
in the long-run explaining 60-80% of the variance compared with less than 20% in the 
previous period. It is also quite noticeable the lack of influence the large business rate has in 
the long run, with the percentage variance ranging from 1-10% compared with 40% in the 
previous period. Housing loan rates, however, are again the most important explanatory    24 
  
variable in forecast error for itself in the short-run, but marginally less so than in the previous 
period.  
Figure 6: Variance Decomposition, 1990:03 – 1996.07 
 
 
It is evident that the introduction of transparent monetary policy announcements has had 
an effect in this period. In all cases, the base rate explains a greater proportion of the forecast 
variance than in the previous period. However, what is also clear is that the above findings 
tend to confirm that over the estimated periods the housing loan market is less competitive 
relative to the business sector; that there appears to have been a systematic pricing difference 
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Figure 7 presents the results for the period 1996-2004. The increasing influence of 
housing loan rates as a component of forecast variance in the long term for all other rates is 
perhaps the most striking feature of this period. Forecast variance in the RBA base rate in the 
short term is explained mainly by itself, with large business and housing loan rates 
contributing a combined 20% in the longer term, indicative of competition and anticipation 
effects. Similar effects are seen in the forecast variance for the other lending rates.  
The above results are mainly indicative of the role that competition in the housing loan 
market has played on the system. The margin between housing loan rates and the RBA cash 
target rate was kept high during the early to mid 1990’s to support the rebuilding of banks 
balance sheets, this allowed mortgage originators to enter the market and build market share. 
These competitive pressures eventually saw the banks reduce housing loan rate independent 
of the RBA cash rate in June 1996 and February 1997. These competitive cuts are the 
underlying cause of housing loan rates becoming an increasing factor in the long run forecast 
variance in the system. This could be also due to market learning effects; given that monetary    26 
  
policy is more transparent with the introduction of announcements, and the introduction of the 
Statement for the Conduct of Monetary Policy, the market has learned to anticipate changes, 
thus reducing the effect of the RBA cash target rate as a driver of long run forecast variance. 
Importantly, the competitive cuts came after the introduction of the Statement for the Conduct 
of Monetary Policy in 1996, implying that only then the banks had the confidence in the 




The empirical work described in the previous sections has showed that the response 
time between a change in the RBA cash rate and a change in retail rates has quickened over 
the past fifteen years. This point is most evident in a comparison between the impulse 
response functions for the periods 1986:1-1989:12 and 1990:3-1996:7 (Figures 2 and 3). This 
indicated that long run adjustment improved from approximately 20 months in the former 
period, to 10 months in the latter period. Results from the analysis indicate that the magnitude 
of the extent of the pass through of changes in the base rate to lending rates has increased over 
the same periods. These findings confirm the evidence presented in Battellino, et al (1997). 
No doubt the main reason in achieving this was the decision by the RBA to announce its 
monetary policy stance from January 1990.  
The introduction of monetary policy transparency has changes the dynamics in the way 
bank lending rates are set in Australia. Variance decomposition analysis for the period 
1990:3-1996:7 (Figure 6) highlights this, with the RBA cash target rate becoming the 
dominant factor in accounting for the majority of the forecast variance in lending rates, in 
both the short and long term. Evidence from the change in the standard deviations of the error 
terms,  it ε , in equations (1a-d) further supports this. Standard deviations from the 1986:1-
1989:12 period, were 45 basis points for the cash rate; 29 basis points for the large business 
rate; 32 basis points for the small business rate; and 27 basis points for housing loan rates. For 
the 1990:3-1996:7 period, standard deviations decreased to 35, 24, 23, 21 basis points 
respectively for each of the interest rates. For the 1996:11-2004:10 period, standard deviations 
further decreased to 15, 11, 14, 13 basis points respectively for each of the interest rates. 
These results confirm the findings of Karfakis and Phipps (1996), who found a similar 
reduction in the risk premium of bank bills post 1990. This also demonstrates that the RBA’s    27 
  
monetary policy transparency initiatives has not only reduced the volatility of bank lending 
rates, but also improved the extent of control the RBA has over the cash and lending rates. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that the RBA does not have to shock the system as much as it 
did in the past to achieve similar results. Monetary policy transparency has resulted in a 
clearer understanding of the RBA’s monetary policy stance and that the RBA has improved 
their creditability in the operation of monetary policy, as well as improving the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in Australia in the 1990s.  
However, results also indicate that retail banks discriminated between the personal and 
business sectors during the 1990-1996 period. Perhaps the main reason for this apparent 
pricing discrimination was due to a lack of competition in the market for housing loans in the 
early to mid 1990s. Although mortgage originators were active in the housing loan market 
from 1992, competition from these institutions has only become important in this market from 
about 1995 (Lowe, 1995). It is apparent in figure 1, margins on housing loans increased by a 
larger amount than business loans in the early 1990s.  
As Lowe (1995) suggested, banks faced with a lack of competition in this particular 
sector, and a high demand for housing loans, were able to exploit customer inertia to increase 
and maintain highly profitable margins. Customer loyalty to traditional financial institutions, 
as well as information and switching costs were instrumental in these higher margins being 
maintained. The high cost of start up for new institutions to enter the market, and particularly 
the long time for these institutions to gain name recognition and respectability with customers 
were also contributing factors. However, what is also apparent from figure 1 is that while the 
margins for housing loans increased by a greater factor, margins for business loans also 
increased. This evidence gives credence to the speculation that the major banks faced with 
record levels of bad debt lagged their adjustment in retail prices downward. As Lowe (1995) 
rightly pointed out, it was only after the occurrence of record bad debts that the spread 
between the RBA cash rate and retail rates widened. Only after the bad debts expense 
diminished and the introduction of the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy did 
margins decline. Only then did the banks have the confidence in the RBA’s monetary policy 
stance to follow anticipation effect in market interest rates and reduce lending rates in 
anticipation of changes in the RBA cash target rate.     28 
  
The evidence shows that the RBA’s transparency innovations has allowed the RBA 
sufficient credibility on their monetary policy stance, such that the central bank no longer has 
to shock the system as often and by as much as it has previously done in the past to meet its 
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Notes 
 
1.  See for example Goodfriend (1991) or Rudebusch (1995).  
 
2.  New Zealand is widely accredited with the first move to a more transparent regime, 
with the introduction of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989.  
3.  The International Monetary Fund has developed, in conjunction with the Bank of 
International Settlements, a code of good practices to make policies of central banks and 
financial agencies "transparent” that is, provided to the public in a clear and timely 
manner. The IMF's Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and 
Financial Policies was adopted in September 1999.  
 
4.  For a discussion of the various factors surrounding the change refer to Battellino, 
Broadbent and Lowe (1997) or MacFarlane (1999).  
 
5.  The overnight cash market at this stage was split into an official and unofficial market 
with authorised dealers. This distinction disappeared in 1995, leaving one overnight 
cash rate.  
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